Judicial Power Attributes

Characteristics and Attributes of Judicial Power

Judicial power is the power “of a court to decide and pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect between persons and parties who bring a case before it for decision.” 1 It is “the right to determine actual controversies arising between diverse litigants, duly instituted in courts of proper jurisdiction.” 2 The terms “judicial power” and “jurisdiction” are frequently used interchangeably, with “jurisdiction” defined as the power to hear and determine the subject matter in controversy between parties to a suit 3 or as the “power to entertain the suit, consider the merits and render a binding decision thereon.” 4 The cases and commentary however, support, indeed require, a distinction between the two concepts.

Judicial Power Attributes and the U.S. Constitution

Jurisdiction is the authority of a court to exercise judicial power in a specific case and is, of course, a prerequisite to the exercise of judicial power, which is the totality of powers a court exercises when it assumes jurisdiction and hears and decides a case.5 Judicial power confers on federal courts the power to decide a case and to render a judgment that conclusively resolves a case. Included within the general judicial power are the ancillary powers of courts to punish for contempt of their authority,6 to issue writs in aid of jurisdiction when authorized by statute,7 to make rules governing their process in the absence of statutory authorizations or prohibitions, 8 to order their own process so as to prevent abuse, oppression, and injustice, and to protect their own jurisdiction and officers in the protection of property in custody of law,9 to appoint masters in chancery, referees, auditors, and other investigators,10 and to admit and disbar attorneys.11

Judicial Power Attributes: Developments

As judicial power is the authority to render dispositive judgments, Congress violates the separation of powers when it purports to alter final judgments of Article III courts.12 Once such instance arose when the Court unexpectedly recognized a statute of limitations for certain securities actions that was shorter than what had been recognized in many jurisdictions, resulting in the dismissal of several suits, which then become final because they were not appealed. Congress subsequently enacted a statute that, though not changing the limitations period prospectively, retroactively extended the time for suits that had been dismissed and provided for the reopening of these final judgments. In Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,13 the Court invalidated the statute, holding it impermissible for Congress to disturb a final judgment. “Having achieved finality,… a judicial decision becomes the last word of the judicial department with regard to a particular case or controversy, and Congress may not declare by retroactive legislation that the law applicable to that very case was something other than what the courts said it was.” 14 In Miller v. French,15 by contrast, the Court ruled that the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s automatic stay of ongoing injunctions remedying violations of prisoners’ rights did not amount to an unconstitutional legislative revision of a final judgment. Rather, the automatic stay merely altered “the prospective effect” of injunctions, and it is well established that such prospective relief “remains subject to alteration due to changes in the underlying law.” 16

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References

This text about Judicial Power Attributes is based on “The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation”, published by the U.S. Government Printing Office.

Notes

[Footnote 1] JUSTICE SAMUEL MILLER, ON THE CONSTITUTION 314 (1891).

[Footnote 2] Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911).

[Footnote 3] United States v. Arrendondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691 (1832).

[Footnote 4] General Investment Co. v. New York Central R.R., 271 U.S. 228, 230 (1926).

[Footnote 5] Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 566 (1933); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 467-68 (1944) (Justice Rutledge dissenting).

[Footnote 6] Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42 (1924).

[Footnote 7] McIntire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cr.) 504 (1813); Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cr.) 75 (1807).

[Footnote 8] Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825).

[Footnote 9] Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U.S. 131 (1888).

[Footnote 10] Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920).

[Footnote 11] Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 378 (1867).

[Footnote 12] Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1995). The Court was careful to delineate the difference between attempting to alter a final judgment, one rendered by a court and either not appealed or affirmed on appeal, and legislatively amending a statute so as to change the law as it existed at the time a court issued a decision that was on appeal or otherwise still alive at the time a federal court reviewed the determination below. A court must apply the law as revised when it considers the prior interpretation. Id. at 226-27. Article III creates or authorizes Congress to create not a collection of unconnected courts, but a judicial department composed of “inferior courts” and “one Supreme Court.” “Within that hierarchy, the decision of an inferior court is not (unless the time for appeal has expired) the final word of the department as a whole.” Id. at 227.

[Footnote 13] 514 U.S. 211 (1995).

[Footnote 14] 514 U.S. at 227 (emphasis supplied by Court).

[Footnote 15] 530 U.S. 327 (2000).

[Footnote 16] 530 U.S. at 344.