Injunctive Power

Congressional Limitation of the Injunctive Power

Although some judicial dicta 1 support the idea of an inherent power of the federal courts sitting in equity to issue injunctions independently of statutory limitations, neither the course taken by Congress nor the specific rulings of the Supreme Court support any such principle. Congress has repeatedly exercised its power to limit the use of the injunction in federal courts. The first limitation on the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts is to be found in § 16 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which provided that no equity suit should be maintained where there was a full and adequate remedy at law. Although this provision did no more than declare a pre-existing rule long applied in chancery courts,2 it did assert the power of Congress to regulate the equity powers of the federal courts. The Act of March 2, 1793,3 prohibited the issuance of any injunction by any court of the United States to stay proceedings in state courts except where such injunctions may be authorized by any law relating to bankruptcy proceedings. In subsequent statutes, Congress prohibited the issuance of injunctions in the federal courts to restrain the collection of taxes,4 provided for a three-judge court as a prerequisite to the issuance of injunctions to restrain the enforcement of state statutes for unconstitutionality,5 for enjoining federal statutes for unconstitutionality,6 and for enjoining orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission,7 limited the power to issue injunctions restraining rate orders of state public utility commissions,8 and the use of injunctions in labor disputes,9 and placed a very rigid restriction on the power to enjoin orders of the Administrator under the Emergency Price Control Act.10

Injunctive Power and the U.S. Constitution

Perhaps pressing its powers further than prior legislation, Congress has enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996.11 Essentially, the law imposes a series of restrictions on judicial remedies in prison-conditions cases. Thus, courts may not issue prospective relief that extends beyond that necessary to correct the violation of a federal right that they have found, that is narrowly drawn, is the least intrusive, and that does not give attention to the adverse impact on public safety. Preliminary injunctive relief is limited by the same standards. Consent decrees may not be approved unless they are subject to the same conditions, meaning that the court must conduct a trial and find violations, thus cutting off consent decrees. If a decree was previously issued without regard to the standards now imposed, the defendant or intervenor is entitled to move to vacate it. No prospective relief is to last longer than two years if any party or intervenor so moves. Finally, a previously issued decree that does not conform to the new standards imposed by the Act is subject to termination upon the motion of the defendant or an intervenor. After a short period (30 or 60 days, depending on whether there is “good cause” for a 30-day extension), such a motion operates as an automatic stay of the prior decree pending the court’s decision on the merits. The Court upheld the termination and automatic stay provisions in Miller v. French,12 rejecting the contention that the automatic stay provision offends separation of powers principles by legislative revision of a final judgment. Rather, Congress merely established new standards for the enforcement of prospective relief, and the automatic stay provision “helps to implement the change in the law.” 13 A number of constitutional challenges can be expected respecting Congress’s power to limit federal judicial authority to remedy constitutional violations.

Injunctive Power: Developments

All of these restrictions have been sustained by the Supreme Court as constitutional and applied with varying degrees of thoroughness. The Court has made exceptions to the application of the prohibition against the stay of proceedings in state courts,14 but it has on the whole adhered to the statute. The exceptions raise no constitutional issues, and the tendency has been alternately to contract and to expand the scope of the exceptions.15 .

More about Injunctive Power

In Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering,16 the Supreme Court placed a narrow construction upon the labor provisions of the Clayton Act and thereby contributed in part to the more extensive restriction by Congress on the use of injunctions in labor disputes in the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, which has not only been declared constitutional 17 but has been applied liberally 18 and in such a manner as to repudiate the notion of an inherent power to issue injunctions contrary to statutory provisions.

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References

This text about Injunctive Power is based on “The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation”, published by the U.S. Government Printing Office.

Notes

[Footnote 1] In United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 339 (1906), Justice Brewer, speaking for the Court, approached a theory of inherent equity jurisdiction when he declared: “The principles of equity exist independently of and anterior to all Congressional legislation, and the statutes are either enunciations of those principles or limitations upon their application in particular cases.” It should be emphasized, however, that the Court made no suggestion that it could apply preexisting principles of equity without jurisdiction over the subject matter. Indeed, the inference is to the contrary. In a dissenting opinion in which Justices McKenna and Van Devanter joined, in Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U.S. 459, 475 (1917), Justice Pitney contended that Article III, § 2, “had the effect of adopting equitable remedies in all cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States where such remedies are appropriate.”

[Footnote 2] Boyce’s Executors v. Grundy, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 210 (1830).

[Footnote 3] 1 Stat. 333, 28 U.S.C. § 2283.

[Footnote 4] 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a).

[Footnote 5] This provision was repealed in 1976, save for apportionment and districting suits and when otherwise required by an Act of Congress. Pub. L. 94-381, § 1, 90 Stat. 1119, and § 3, 28 U.S.C. § 2284. Congress occasionally provides for such courts, as in the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973c.

[Footnote 6] Repealed by Pub. L. 94-381, § 2, 90 Stat. 1119 (1976). Congress occasionally provides for such courts now, in order to expedite Supreme Court consideration of constitutional challenges to critical federal laws. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 719-721 (1986) (3-judge court and direct appeal to Supreme Court in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985).

[Footnote 7] Repealed by Pub. L. 93-584, § 7, 88 Stat. 1918.

[Footnote 8] 28 U.S.C. § 1342.

[Footnote 9] 29 U.S.C. §§ 52, 101-110.

[Footnote 10] 56 Stat. 31, 204 (1942).

[Footnote 11] The statute was part of an Omnibus Appropriations Act signed by the President on April 26, 1996. Pub. L. 104-134, §§ 801-10, 110 Stat. 1321-66-1321-77, amending 18 U.S.C. § 3626.

[Footnote 12] 530 U.S. 327 (2000).

[Footnote 13] 530 U.S. at 348.

[Footnote 14] Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1861); Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U.S. 10 (1876); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).

[Footnote 15] See, Anti-Injunction Statute, infra.

[Footnote 16] 254 U.S. 443 (1921).

[Footnote 17] Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938); New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938).

[Footnote 18] In addition to Lauf and New Negro Alliance, see Drivers’ Union v. Valley Co., 311 U.S. 91, 100-103 (1940), and compare Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962), with Boys Markets v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).