Injunctions

Federal Restraint of State Courts by Injunctions

Even where the federal anti-injunction law is inapplicable, or where the question of application is not reached,1 those seeking to enjoin state court proceedings must overcome substantial prudential barriers, among them the abstention doctrine 2 and more important than that the equity doctrine that suits in equity “shall not be sustained in… the courts of the United States, in any case where plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at law.” 3 The application of this latter principle has been most pronounced in the reluctance of federal courts to interfere with a state’s good faith enforcement of its criminal law. Here, the Court has required of a litigant seeking to bar threatened state prosecution not only a showing of irreparable injury that is both great and immediate, but also an inability to defend his constitutional rights in the state proceeding. Certain types of injury, such as the cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of having to defend against a single criminal prosecution, are insufficient to be considered irreparable in this sense. Even if a state criminal statute is unconstitutional, a person charged under it usually has an adequate remedy at law by raising his constitutional defense in the state trial.4 The policy has never been stated as an absolute, in recognition of the fact that a federal court injunction could properly issue in exceptional and limited circumstances, such as the existence of factors making it impossible for a litigant to protect his federal constitutional rights through a defense of the state criminal charges or the bringing of multiple criminal charges.5

Injunctions and the U.S. Constitution

In Dombrowski v. Pfister,6 the Court appeared to change the policy somewhat. The case on its face contained allegations and offers of proof that may have been sufficient alone to establish the “irreparable injury” justifying federal injunctive relief.7 But the formulation of standards by Justice Brennan for the majority placed great emphasis upon the fact that the state criminal statute in issue regulated expression. Any criminal prosecution under a statute regulating expression might of itself inhibit the exercise of First Amendment rights, he said, and prosecution under an overbroad statute,8 such as the one in this case, might critically impair exercise of those rights. The mere threat of prosecution under such an overbroad statute “may deter… almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions…. ” 9

Injunctions: Developments

In such cases, courts could no longer embrace “[t]he assumption that defense of a criminal prosecution will generally assure ample vindication of constitutional rights,” because either the mere threat of prosecution or the long wait between prosecution and final vindication could result in a “chilling effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights.” 10 The principle apparently established by the Court was two-phased: a federal court should not abstain when there is a facially unconstitutional statute infringing upon speech and application of that statute discourages protected activities, and the court should further enjoin the state proceedings when there is prosecution or threat of prosecution under an overbroad statute regulating expression if the prosecution or threat of prosecution chills the exercise of freedom of expression.11 These formulations were reaffirmed in Zwickler v. Koota,12 in which a declaratory judgment was sought with regard to a statute prohibiting anonymous election literature. The Court deemed abstention improper,13 and further held that adjudication for purposes of declaratory judgment is not hemmed in by considerations attendant upon injunctive relief.14

More about Injunctions

The aftermath of Dombrowski and Zwickler was a considerable expansion of federal-court adjudication of constitutional attack through requests for injunctive and declaratory relief, which gradually spread out from First Amendment areas to other constitutionally protected activities.15 However, these developments were highly controversial and, after three arguments on the issue, the Court in a series of 1971 cases receded from its position and circumscribed the discretion of the lower federal courts to a considerable and everbroadening degree.16 The important difference between the 1971 cases and the Dombrowski-Zwickler line was that, in the latter there were no prosecutions pending, whereas in the 1971 cases there were. Nevertheless, the care with which Justice Black for the majority in the 1971 cases undertook to distinguish Dombrowski signified a limitation of its doctrine.

Other Aspects

Justice Black reviewed and reaffirmed the traditional rule of reluctance to interfere with state court proceedings except in extraordinary circumstances. The holding in Dombrowski, as distinguished from some of its language, did not change the general rule, because extraordinary circumstances had existed. Thus, Justice Black, with considerable support from the other Justices,17 went on to affirm that, where a criminal proceeding is already pending in a state court, if it is a single prosecution about which there is no allegation that it was brought in bad faith or that it was one of a series of repeated prosecutions that would be brought, and if the defendant may put in issue his federal-constitutional defense at the trial, then federal injunctive relief is improper, even if it is alleged that the statute on which the prosecution was based regulated expression and was overbroad.

More about Injunctions

Many statutes regulating expression were valid and some overbroad statutes could be validly applied, so findings of facial unconstitutionality abstracted from concrete factual situations was not a sound judicial method. “It is sufficient for purposes of the present case to hold, as we do, that the possible unconstitutionality of a statute ‘on its face’ does not in itself justify an injunction against good-faith attempts to enforce it, and that appellee Harris has failed to make any showing of bad faith, harassment, or any other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief.” 18

The reason for the principle, said Justice Black, flows from “Our Federalism,” which requires federal courts to defer to state courts when there are proceedings pending in them.19

Moreover, in a companion case, the Court held that, when prosecutions are pending in state court, the propriety of injunctive and declaratory relief should ordinarily be judged by the same standards. 20 A declaratory judgment is as likely to interfere with state proceedings as an injunction, whether the federal decision be treated as res judicata or viewed as a strong precedent guiding the state court. Additionally, “the Declaratory Judgment Act provides that after a declaratory judgment is issued the district court may enforce it by granting ‘[f]urther necessary or proper relief,’ 28 U.S.C. § 2202, and therefore a declaratory judgment issued while state proceedings are pending might serve as the basis for a subsequent injunction against those proceedings to ‘protect or effectuate’ the declaratory judgment, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, and thus result in a clearly improper interference with the state proceedings.” 21

When, however, there is no pending state prosecution, the Court is clear that “Our Federalism” is not offended if a plaintiff in a federal court is able to demonstrate a genuine threat of enforcement of a disputed criminal statute, whether the statute is attacked on its face or as applied, and becomes entitled to a federal declaratory judgment.22 And, in fact, when no state prosecution is pending, a federal plaintiff need not demonstrate the existence of the Younger factors to justify the issuance of a preliminary or permanent injunction against prosecution under a disputed state statute.23

Of much greater significance is the extension of Younger to civil proceedings in state courts 24 and to state administrative proceedings of a judicial nature.25 The Younger principle applies whenever the state, or its officers or agency, is seeking to promote important state interests in civil or administrative proceedings. Indeed, the presence of important state interests in state proceedings has been held to raise the Younger bar to federal relief in proceedings which are entirely between private parties.26 Comity, the Court said, requires abstention when states have “important” interests in pending civil proceedings between private parties,27 as long as litigants are not precluded from asserting federal rights. Thus, the Court explained, “proper respect for the ability of state courts to resolve federal questions presented in state court litigation mandates that the federal court stay its hand.” 28

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References

This text about Injunctions is based on “The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation”, published by the U.S. Government Printing Office.

Notes

[Footnote 1] 28 U.S.C. § 2283 may be inapplicable because no state court proceeding is pending or because the action is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Its application may never be reached because a court may decide that equitable principles do not justify injunctive relief. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971).

[Footnote 2] See “Abstention,” supra.

[Footnote 3] The quoted phrase setting out the general principle is from the Judiciary Act of 1789, § 16, 1 Stat. 82.

[Footnote 4] The older cases are Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926); Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935); Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45 (1941); Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941); Williams v. Miller, 317 U.S. 599 (1942); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943). There is a stricter rule against federal restraint of the use of evidence in state criminal trials. Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951); Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U.S. 458 (1961). The Court reaffirmed the rule in Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971). State officers may not be enjoined from testifying or using evidence gathered in violation of federal constitutional restrictions, Cleary v. Bolger, 371 U.S. 392 (1963), but the rule is unclear with regard to federal officers and state trials. Compare Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956), with Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381 (1961).

[Footnote 5] E.g., Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 163-164 (1943); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 122 (1951). See also Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 214 (1923), Future criminal proceedings were sometimes enjoined. E.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).

[Footnote 6] 380 U.S. 479 (1965). Grand jury indictments had been returned after the district court had dissolved a preliminary injunction, erroneously in the Supreme Court’s view, so that it took the view that no state proceedings were pending as of the appropriate time. For a detailed analysis of the case, see Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L. J. 1103 (1977).

[Footnote 7] “[T]he allegations in this complaint depict a situation in which defense of the State’s criminal prosecution will not assure adequate vindication of constitutional rights. They suggest that a substantial loss of or impairment of freedoms of expression will occur if appellants must await the state court’s disposition and ultimate review in this Court of any adverse determination. These allegations, if true, clearly show irreparable injury.” 380 U.S. at 485-86.

[Footnote 8] That is, a statute that reaches both protected and unprotected expression and conduct.

[Footnote 9] 380 U.S. at 486.

[Footnote 10] 380 U.S. at 486, 487.

[Footnote 11] See Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741 (1965); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968).

[Footnote 12] 389 U.S. 241 (1967). The state criminal conviction had been reversed by a state court on state law grounds and no new charge had been instituted.

[Footnote 13] It was clear that the statute could not be construed by a state court to render unnecessary a federal constitutional decision. 389 U.S. at 248-52.

[Footnote 14] 389 U.S. at 254.

[Footnote 15] Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court Proceedings: The Significance of Dombrowski, 48 TEX. L. REV. 535 (1970).

[Footnote 16] Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971). Justice Black wrote the majority opinion in the first four of these cases; the other two were per curiam opinions.

[Footnote 17] Only Justice Douglas dissented. 401 U.S. at 58. Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall generally concurred in a restrained fashion. Id. at 56, 75, 93.

[Footnote 18] 401 U.S. at 54. On bad faith enforcement, see id. at 56 (Justices Stewart and Harlan concurring); 97 (Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall concurring in part and dissenting in part). For an example, see Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance, 559 F.2d 1286, 1293-1301 (5th Cir. 1977), aff’d per curiam sub nom. Dexter v. Butler, 587 F.2d 176 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929 (1979).

[Footnote 19] 401 U.S. at 44.

[Footnote 20] Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971). The holding was in line with Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943).

[Footnote 21] Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 72 (1971).

[Footnote 22] Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974).

[Footnote 23] Doran v. Salem Inn, 422 U.S. 922 (1975) (preliminary injunction may issue to preserve status quo while court considers whether to grant declaratory relief); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (when declaratory relief is given, permanent injunction may be issued if necessary to protect constitutional rights). However, it may not be easy to discern when state proceedings will be deemed to have been instituted prior to the federal proceeding. E.g., Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975); Huffman v. Pursue. Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975); see also Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).

[Footnote 24] Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975); Judice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979); Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982).

[Footnote 25] Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619 (1986). The “judicial in nature” requirement is more fully explicated in New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 366-373 (1989).

[Footnote 26] Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987).

[Footnote 27] “[T]he State’s interest in protecting ‘the authority of the judicial system, so that its orders and judgments are not rendered nugatory’ ” was deemed sufficient. 481 U.S. at 14 n.12 (quoting Judice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 336 n.12 (1977)).

[Footnote 28] 481 U.S. at 14.