Federalism Limits on Exercise of Commerce Power

Federalism Limits on Exercise of Commerce Power

Federalism Limits on Exercise of Commerce Power Definition

As is recounted below, prior to reconsideration of the federal commerce power in the 1930s, the Court in effect followed a doctrine of “dual federalism,” under which Congress's power to regulate much activity depended on whether it had a “direct” rather than an “indirect” effect on interstate commerce.1 When the restrictive interpretation was swept away during and after the New Deal, the question of federalism limits respecting congressional regulation of private activities became moot. However, in a number of instances the states engaged in commercial activities that would be regulated by federal legislation if the enterprise were privately owned, and the Court easily sustained application of federal law to these state proprietary activities.2 However, as Congress began to extend regulation to state governmental activities, the judicial response was inconsistent and wavering.3 Although the Court may shift again to constrain federal power on federalism grounds, at the present time the rule is that Congress lacks authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate the states as states in some circumstances, namely, when the federal statutory provisions “commandeer” a state's legislative or executive authority in order to implement a regulatory program. 4

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This text about Federalism Limits on Exercise of Commerce Power is based on “The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation”, published by the U.S. Government Printing Office.

[Footnote 1] E.g., United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). Of course, there existed much of this time a parallel doctrine under which federal power was not so limited. E.g., Houston & Texas Ry. v. United States (The Shreveport Rate Case), 234 U.S. 342 (1914).

[Footnote 2] E.g., California v. United States, 320 U.S. 577 (1944); California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957).

[Footnote 3] For example, federal regulation of the wages and hours of certain state and local governmental employees has alternatively been upheld and invalidated. See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).

[Footnote 4] New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). For elaboration, see the discussions under the Supremacy Clause and under the Tenth Amendment.

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