Exclusionary Rule

Introduction

According to the Encyclopedia of the American Constitution, when the police obtain evidence by violating the bill of rights, the victim of their misconduct may lack any effective legal remedy. Yet some enforcement mechanism is necessary if several important constitutional guarantees are to be a reality and not merely expressions of hope.

Case Law

The heart of the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures lies in this question: If an unlawful search or seizure does occur, can that “tainted evidence” be used in court? If so, the 4th Amendment offers no real protection to a person accused of crime.

To meet that problem, the Court adopted, and is still refining, the exclusionary rule. Essentially, the rule is this: Evidence gained as the result of an illegal act by police cannot be used at the trial of the person from whom it was seized.

The rule was first laid down in Weeks v. United States, 1914. In that narcotics case, the Court held that evidence obtained illegally by federal officers could not be used in the federal courts. For decades, however, the Court left questions of the use of such evidence in State courts for each State to decide for itself.

Mapp v. Ohio

The exclusionary rule was finally extended to the States in Mapp v. Ohio, 1961. There, the Court held that the 14th Amendment forbids unreasonable searches and seizures by State and local officers just as the 4th Amendment bars such actions by federal officers. It also held that the fruits of an unlawful search or seizure cannot be used in the State courts, just as they cannot be used in the federal courts.

In Mapp, Cleveland police had gone to Dollree Mapp’s home to search for gambling evidence. They entered her home forcibly, and without a warrant. Their very extensive search failed to turn up any gambling evidence, but they did find some obscene books. Mapp was convicted of possession of obscene materials and sentenced to jail. The Court overturned her conviction, holding that the evidence against her had been found and seized without a warrant.

Cases Narrowing the Rule

The exclusionary rule has always been controversial. It was intended to put teeth into the 4th Amendment, and it has. It says to police: As you enforce the law, obey the law. The rule seeks to prevent, or at least deter, police misconduct.

Critics of the rule say that it means that some persons who are clearly guilty nonetheless go free. Why, they ask, should criminals be able to “beat the rap” on “a technicality”?

The High Court has narrowed the scope of the rule somewhat over the years–most notably in four cases.

In Nix v. Williams, 1984, it found an “inevitable discovery” exception to the rule. The Court ruled that tainted evidence can be used in court if that evidence would have turned up no matter what–“ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.”
In United States v. Leon, 1984, the Court found a “good faith” exception to the rule. There, federal agents in Los Angeles had used what they thought was a proper warrant to seize illicit drugs. Their warrant was later shown to be faulty, however. The Court upheld their actions nonetheless. It said: “When an officer acting with objective good faith has obtained a search warrant … and acted within its scope … there is nothing to deter.”
In Arizona v. Evans, 1995, the Court held that the good faith exception applied in a case where evidence of a crime was seized by police who acted on the basis of a computer printout that later proved to be erroneous. The printout indicated an outstanding arrest warrant against the defendant in the case. In fact, there was no warrant. The computer error was made by court clerks, not the police-who, the Court said, acted in good faith.
In Maryland v. Garrison, 1987, the Court gave police room for “honest mistakes.” There, it allowed the use of evidence seized in the mistaken search of an apartment in Baltimore. Officers had a warrant to search for drugs in an apartment on the third floor of a building. Not realizing that there were two apartments there, they entered and found drugs in the wrong apartment-the one for which they did not have a warrant.

Resources

References and Further Reading

Davies, Thomas Y. “A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) about the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of “Lost” Arrests.” American Bar Foundation Research Journal (1983): 611.
Foote, Caleb. “Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights.” Minnesota Law Review 39 (1955): 493.
Kamisar, Yale. “Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a “Principled Basis” Rather Than on an “Empirical Proposition”?” Creighton Law Review 16 (1983): 565.
Orfield, Myron W., Jr. “Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts.” University of Colorado Law Review 63 (1992): 75.
Slobogin, Christopher. “Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule.” University of Illinois Law Review (1999): 363.
Stuntz, William J. “The Virtue and Vices of the Exclusionary Rule.” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 20 (1997): 443.
Wigmore, John Henry. “Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure.” American Bar Association Journal 8 (1922): 479.
“Criminal Procedure.” 1993. The Conviser Mini Review. Orlando, Fla.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Professional Publications.
Glasser, Larry. 2003. “The American Exclusionary Rule Debate.” George Washington International Law Review 35.
Kamisar, Yale. 2003. “In Defense of the Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule.” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 26.

Exclusionary Rule